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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alfredo Cabrera appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Cabrera claims the 
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Deputy Travis DeBie responded to a request for assistance at a dairy in 
Twin Falls where Deputy DeBie was asked to make contact with Alejandro 
Gordobea 1 and ask him to "stop sending threatening text message[s]." (Tr.2 , p. 7, 
Ls.3-16.) Upon arriving at the dairy, Deputy DeBie talked to two men and asked 
if they knew Gordobea and told them he needed to find Gordobea. (Tr., p.8, 
Ls.3-17.) After advising the men why he needed to speak to Gordobea, they 
initially denied knowing him but then "said that they believed that he lived in the 
apartments on the dairy." (Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.2.) The two men were later 
identified as Gordobea and Cabrera. (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.) 
After he was unable to locate Gordobea at the apartments, Deputy DeBrie 
spoke with the dairy foreman who told him Gordobea was in the barn and the 
foreman described one of the men that initially directed Deputy DeBrie to the 
1 At the suppression hearing, Deputy DeBrie referred to Alejandro Gordobea, 
which is the name used in Deputy DeBrie's Affidavit in Support of Complaint (R., 
pp.10-11,) as Alejandro Cordova. For consistency with the Appellant's Brief, the 
state will use Gordobea even though Deputy DeBrie used Cordova in his 
testimony. 
2 There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal. All transcript 
references in this brief are to the transcript containing the suppression hearing. 
1 
apartments. (Tr., p.10, Ls.922.) The foreman accompanied Deputy DeBrie back 
to the barn. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2.) The foreman saw Cordova running away. (Tr., 
p.11, Ls.4-7.) Deputy DeBrie saw Cabrera and told him he "needed to talk to 
him." (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11.) Cabrera "started to run" and Deputy DeBrie "shouted 
for him to stop and come talk to [him]." (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-13.) Cabrera stopped 
and came back to talk to the deputy and eventually admitted he was "good 
friends" with Gordobea and that they lied because they were afraid Gordobea 
"was in trouble and might be arrested." (Tr., p.11, Ls.14-25.) "After questioning," 
Deputy DeBrie arrested Cabrera for "obstructing and delaying a peace officer." 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4.) A search incident to arrest revealed a clear glass pipe with 
methamphetamine residue. (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-16.) 
The state charged Cabrera with possession of methamphetamine. (R., 
pp.8-9, 40-41.) Cabrera filed a motion to suppress, claiming his arrest was 
unlawful and, therefore, the methamphetamine discovered during the search 
incident to his arrest must be suppressed. (R., pp.55-56.) The district court 
denied the motion after which Cabrera entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
charged offense, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion. (R., pp.88, 127-128, 131-141.) The court imposed a unified six-year 
sentence with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Cabrera 




Cabrera states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Cabrera's motion to 
suppress the evidence found during the search incident to arrest 
since the arrest was unlawful. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Because Cabrera's arrest was lawful, has Cabrera failed to establish the 
district court erred by denying Cabrera's motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered during a search incident to that arrest? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cabrera Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Suppress Evidence Found As A Result Of The Search Incident To His Lawful 
Arrest 
A. Introduction 
Cabrera contends the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress, arguing, as he did below that his arrest was invalid. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.5-13.) Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing shows Cabrera has failed to meet his burden of showing 
error in the district court's decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Not Required 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a well-
4 
established exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); 
Kerley. 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. "For an arrest to be considered lawful, 
it must be based on probable cause" to believe the arrestee has committed a 
crime. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) 
(citations omitted). "Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been 
or is being committed." 1ft (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). 
In order to validly arrest Cabrera, Deputy DeBrie had to have probable 
cause to believe Cabrera resisted and obstructed in violation of I.C. § 18-705. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 816, 203 P.3d at 1215. The elements of resisting and 
obstructing are: "(1) the person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed was a 
law enforcement officer; (2) the defendant knew that the person was an officer; 
and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that the officer was 
attempting to perform some official act or duty." 1ft Cabrera does not dispute 
that Deputy DeBrie was performing an official act or duty or that he knew Deputy 
DeBrie was a law enforcement officer. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Instead, Cabrera 
contends his arrest was unlawful because, he claims, his conduct did not 
constitute resisting, delaying or obstructing. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) In support of 
this argument, Cabrera relies on State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885, 908 P.2d 
578 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Brandstetter was an attorney who represented a defendant "charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver." Brandstetter, 127 
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Idaho at 886, 908 P.2d at 579. Law enforcement also believed Brandstetter's 
client was involved in money laundering and they ultimately obtained a search 
warrant for Brandstetter's office to search for the defendant's safe, which they 
believed had been delivered to Brandstetter's firm. kt When police interviewed 
Brandstetter regarding the location of the safe, "Brandstetter claimed that the 
safe was never present in the law offices" and said, if anyone reported that the 
defendant's safe was there, that was "bullshit." kt After the safe was discovered 
in the alley next to Brandstetter's office, police arrested Brandstetter for resisting 
and obstructing based on Brandstetter "making a false statement." kt, 127 Idaho 
at 886-887 and n.3, 908 P.2d at 579-580 and n.3. "Thus, the question on appeal 
[was] whether under the particular facts of th[e] case the nonthreatening false 
statement, not made under oath, falls within the purview of the § 18-705 
prohibition against obstructing an officer." Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 888, 908 P.2d 
at 581. Answering this question, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Here, we believe it is doubtful that Brandstetter can be said 
to have hampered police officials in the exercise of their duties by 
falsely responding to a question which he was not legally obligated 
to answer. His deliberate falsification was no more obstructive than 
would have been his silence. Because Brandstetter could have 
remained silent when questioned by the law enforcement officials, 
his unsworn oral misstatement cannot be said to have increased 
the officers' burden, on the facts presented here. We, therefore, 
find that Brandstetter's making of an unsworn false oral statement 
to the police was not an obstruction of an officer within the meaning 
of I.C. § 18-705. 
Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 888, 908 P.2d at 581. 
The district court correctly concluded Brandstetter is "inapposite with the 
facts here." (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-17.) Cabrera did not simply deny knowing 
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Gordobea or his location. Instead, he expressly misdirected the officer away 
from the individual he was looking for and suggested he go look for Gordobea in 
apartments located on the dairy. (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-8.) This conduct 
unquestionably delayed and obstructed Deputy DeBrie in pursuit of his lawful 
duty, thereby "increas[ing]" Deputy DeBrie's "burden." Brandstetter, 127 Idaho at 
888, 908 P.2d at 581. As such, Deputy DeBrie had probable cause to arrest 
Cabrera. This result is consistent with prior cases. See, ~. State v. George, 
127 Idaho 693, 699, 905 P.2d 626, 632 (1995) (officer "could lawfully request 
George's driver's license, registration and proof of insurance so that he could 
identify the person with whom he was dealing" and "fact that George would not 
cooperate with the officer constituted delaying and obstructing an officer in 
carrying out one of the duties of his office pursuant to I.C. § 18-705"); State v. 
Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 363, 63 P.3d 485, 489 (Ct. App. 2003) (sufficient 
evidence of obstructing where defendant fled on his bike after officers said they 
wanted to speak to him, defendant then hid in closet and refused to come out of 
hiding spot); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604, 607, 790 P.2d 385, 388 (Ct. App. 
1990) ("Wight's reaction in pushing the officer constituted sufficient grounds to 
arrest him for obstructing and delaying."). 
State v. Quimby, 122 Idaho 389, 834 P.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1992), is 
representative of just such a case. In Quimby, the Court considered "whether 
there was probable cause to place Quimby under arrest for obstructing a police 
officer." kl, 122 Idaho at 391, 834 P.2d at 908. The Court concluded there was, 
stating: 
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In the present case, there is no question that the officers had 
probable cause to arrest Quimby for obstructing their attempt to 
arrest his brother. Though Quimby did not touch the officers, he 
placed himself in the path of the officers, forcing them to push him 
out of the way. Quimby ignored the officers' repeated verbal 
requests to move away. He placed himself unnecessarily close to 
the officers and made hand gestures in front of their faces. These 
facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for Quimby's arrest. 
Cabrera's arrest was lawful and, as a result, so was the search incident to 
his arrest. Cabrera has failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the 
denial of his suppression motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district 
court entered upon Cabrera's conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetam i ne. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2014. 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Dep(Jty Attorney General 
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